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JUDICIAL CREDIBILITY
BERT I. HUANG*
ABSTRACT
Do people believe a federal court when it rules against the
government? And does such judicial credibility depend on the per-
ceived political affiliation of the judge? This study presents a survey
experiment addressing these questions, based on a set of recent cases
in which both a judge appointed by President George W. Bush and
a judge appointed by President Bill Clinton declared the same
Trump Administration action to be unlawful. The findings offer evi-
dence that, in a politically salient case, the partisan identification of
the judge—here, as a “Bush judge” or “Clinton judge”—can influence
the credibility of judicial review in the public mind.
* Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Intellectual Life, Columbia Law
School. I wish to thank Neal Devins, Allison Orr Larsen, and the journal editors for inviting
me to join this enriching symposium. For insightful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful
to Benjamin Minhao Chen, Erin Delaney, Joshua Fischman, David Fontana, Jamal Greene,
Tara Leigh Grove, Allison Orr Larsen, Marin  Levy, and Jamie Macleod. I also learned much
from many helpful conversations with colleagues at the Judicial Administration Roundtable
at Duke University and at this symposium. I thank Rebecca Arno, Katy Berk, Jennifer Dayrit,
and Scott Glass for superb research assistance, as well as Columbia Law School for research
support.
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INTRODUCTION
“We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or
Clinton judges.”1 So says Chief Justice John Roberts. But what do
the people think?
This Article uses a survey experiment to see if there may be
differences in how much credibility a judicial ruling gets in the
public mind, depending on whether the judge is labeled a “Bush
judge” or a “Clinton judge.” Here is how the experiment works:
Among the federal courts recently ruling against the Trump Admin-
istration on an issue of national salience, one of the district judges
was appointed by President George W. Bush and another was
appointed by President Bill Clinton.2 The issue at hand is the
Administration’s attempt to cancel the Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals program, or DACA, which was started by the Obama
Administration to provide deportation relief for certain immigrants,
often called “Dreamers.”3 This study was conducted before the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in these cases.
Each of these two district judges ruled that the Trump Administra-
tion’s attempted rescission of the DACA program was unlawful.4
And because they issued opinions that overlap in reasoning and
1. This quote from Chief Justice Roberts was widely reported as a response to a
presidential comment that had criticized a ruling against the Administration as coming from
an “Obama judge.” See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of ‘Obama Judge,’
Chief Justice Roberts Defends Judiciary as ‘Independent,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:21
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-
chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e8-96d4-
0d23f2 aaad09_story.html [https://perma.cc/9T3E-S2FV]. For the original story, see Mark
Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap over Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov.
21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cf1e3deb6b84 [https://perma.cc/
F6X5-VPJY]. The quote goes on to say that “[w]hat we have is an extraordinary group of
dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appearing before them.”
Barnes, supra.
2. These cases, and the judges who ruled in them, are detailed below. See infra notes 20-
25 and accompanying text.
3. For a fuller explanation of the DACA program, see infra note 30 and accompanying
text.
4. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215-16 (D.D.C. 2018) (Bates, J.), cert. before
judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Alsup, J.), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).
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result, it becomes possible to conduct an experiment—accurately
informing one group of survey subjects that the judge who ruled this
way was appointed by President Bush, while telling another group
that the judge was appointed by President Clinton. The outcomes of
interest are these: What do survey subjects believe about the
lawfulness of the Trump Administration’s action, after being told
about federal court rulings declaring it unlawful? And do subjects’
responses differ based on whether the judge is a Bush or Clinton
appointee?5
The aim here is to observe “judicial credibility” in a straightfor-
ward sense—the degree of influence that a court’s ruling has on
people’s beliefs about the very question ruled upon by the court.6
More specifically, in this case it can be seen as the credibility of
judicial review, given that the rulings concern the legality of a
5. At the risk of stating the obvious, this study is not about whether Democrat-appointed
judges and Republican-appointed judges actually tend to rule differently. That question is the
subject of a massive literature; for a thoughtful recent review in this journal by a leader in the
field, see Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2017 (2016). For a recent experimental study about the possible role of ideology in legal
judgments, involving actual judges, see Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?
An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 349 (2016). Whether people perceive federal judges as deciding based on ideology or
politics is also well-studied. See, e.g., Max Greenwood, Majority of Voters Believe Federal
Judges Inject Politics into Rulings: Poll, THE HILL (Dec. 3, 2018, 12:25 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/419457-majority-of-voters-believe-federal-judges-
inject-politics-into-rulings-poll [https://perma.cc/MW2C-ZPWX] (“Two-thirds of registered
voters in the United States believe that federal judges’ legal rulings have become increasingly
tainted by political bias.”). My study goes one step beyond, by investigating one possible
implication of such public perceptions of judges—the credibility of their rulings, in the public
mind.
6. Note that this rather simple definition of judicial credibility is intertwined with a
varied set of more complex concepts that the literature has often referred to as the
“legitimacy” of a judiciary or a legal system. Professor Fallon’s survey offers an insightful
taxonomy. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 20-46 (2018)
(explaining the categories of sociological, moral, and legal legitimacy); see also Tara Leigh
Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019) (discussing
Professor Fallon’s taxonomy and the possible tensions among the categories in practice) (book
review). What is measured in this study is also related to (and yet differs from) data about
people’s degree of diffuse support for the judiciary, sometimes used as a metric for the
“institutional legitimacy” of the courts (and usually of the U.S. Supreme Court). For a high-
level review of such studies, see Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, U.S. Supreme Court
Legitimacy: Unanswered Questions and an Agenda for Future Research, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 132, 132-50 (Robert M. Howard & Kirk A. Randazzo eds.,
2018). The Conclusion will say more about how the concept of judicial credibility, as defined
here, intersects with these various meanings of legitimacy.
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government action. How much credibility does a federal court’s
decision have in influencing people’s beliefs about what the
government can or cannot lawfully do? And does that credibility
depend on the perceived political affiliation of the judge?
Worries about questions such as these are what motivated Chief
Justice Roberts, presumably, to fire off such a public retort to a
presidential comment criticizing a ruling against the Administration
as coming from an “Obama judge.”7 The prospect of eroding respect
for at least one federal judge also seems to be what motivated that
comment in the first place, as well as a later tweet replying to the
Chief Justice.8 But it is not only the most partisan voices who are la-
beling federal judges like this: even major news outlets have now
made a habit of saying which president appointed a given federal
judge, perhaps seeing it as information a reader might wish to know
or ought to know.9 How much has the public internalized these
7. See Barnes, supra note 1. Chief Justice Roberts is not the only one concerned about
such norms-breaking presidential attacks on the courts or other legal institutions. See, e.g.,
Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465
(2018); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018);
Michael D. Shear & Katie Benner, Trump’s War on the Justice System Threatens to Erode
Trust in the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/us/politics/
trump-justice-legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/7TQF-GP6S]; Nina Totenberg, Trump’s
Criticism of Judges out of Line with Past Presidents, NPR (Feb. 11, 2017, 6:19 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514587731/trumps-criticism-of-judges-out-of-line-with-past-
presidents [https://perma.cc/T45Q-YHEP]. 
8. The reply tweet stated: “Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have
‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much different point of view than the people who are charged
with the safety of our country. It would be great if the 9th Circuit was indeed an ‘independent
judiciary.’” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1065346909362143232 [https://perma.cc/4BCL-443V]. For
a recent study of how comments on social media might affect not only public perceptions of
the federal judiciary, but also participants in the system, see Jeffrey L. Fisher & Allison Orr
Larsen, Virtual Briefing at the Supreme Court, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 85 (2019).
9. See Josh Gerstein, Third Judge Rules Against Trump Move to End DACA, POLITICO
(Apr. 24, 2018, 8:09 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/24/third-judge-rules-against-
trump-daca-550092 [https://perma.cc/2PRL-U2SP] (“Bates, who was appointed by President
George W. Bush, is the first Republican appointee to rule against President Donald Trump’s
move to wind down DACA. Two district court judges appointed by President Bill Clinton ...
previously came to similar conclusions.”); Tom Hals, U.S. Appeals Court Rules Against Trump
on DACA Immigration Program, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-immigration-daca/u-s-appeals-court-rules-against-trump-on-daca-immigration-
program-idUSKCN1ND2QN [https://perma.cc/R37Y-S62C] (“Wardlaw was appointed by
Democratic former President Bill Clinton. The other two judges, John Owens and Jacqueline
Nguyen, were appointed by Obama, a Democrat.”); Ann E. Marimow & Robert Barnes,
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pervasive signals about the relevance of the appointing president for
assessing a judge’s rulings? Could such signals be eroding public
respect for the federal judiciary?10 Could the political labeling of
judges even affect whether people believe the rulings of our federal
courts?
This study takes an empirical step toward answering such ques-
tions. To venture some hypotheses, it is easy to imagine various
psychological factors that may be at work.11 First, some people may
give more credibility to a judge perceived to share their own political
leaning.12 Second, some may give more credibility to a ruling against
the Administration if it comes from a judge perceived to be more
sympathetic toward the Administration—as when a child asks her
more lenient parent for a chocolate, but is still told “no.”13 These two
Appeals Court Finds Trump Administration’s Move to End DACA ‘Arbitrary and Capricious,’
WASH. POST (May 17, 2019, 3:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/
appeals-court-finds-trump-administrations-move-to-end-daca-arbitrary-and-capricious/2019/
05/17/580d2c04-5ba1-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html [https://perma.cc/D958-6ZK2]
(noting that Judge Richardson, who dissented, was “named to the court by President Trump,”
and that of the two judges in the majority, “Diaz was nominated by President Barack Obama,
and King by President Bill Clinton”).
10. See, e.g., Shear & Benner, supra note 7. For a recent survey-experiment study of the
impact of the President’s rhetoric on diffuse-support measures of institutional legitimacy for
the U.S. Supreme Court, see Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has Trump Trumped the
Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 39 (2018) (“In short, our results suggest that criticisms
of the Court made by President Trump are not associated with change in support for the
Court regardless of the content of the criticism the President makes. On the other hand,
criticisms by law professors that the Court has become politicized are potent.”).
11. Potential interactions among these (and other) factors are also imaginable, and a
range of factors might be at work within the mind of any given individual.
12. For example, some might assign more credibility to a judge seen as coming from one’s
own in-group—here, based on political affiliation—perhaps due to an expectation of sharing
a legal philosophy or ideology, or due to a greater trust in a fellow group member’s judgment.
Or there may be an adverse reaction to the ruling of a judge perceived to be an outsider, or
in an opposed group. It should go without saying, though, that some survey subjects might not
see themselves as belonging to the same in-group as a Bush-appointed judge (or Trump
Administration officials, for that matter); and some might not consider a Clinton-appointed
judge to be an outsider or in an opposed group.
13. Consider how news reports sometimes carry a note of surprise on occasions when a
Trump-appointed judge has ruled against the Administration. See, e.g., Christal Hayes, It’s
Not Just ‘Obama Judges. Here Are Republican Appointees Who Have Ruled Against Trump,
USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/
24/five-times-republican-appointed-judges-ruled-against-president-trump/2083399002/
[https://perma.cc/UV5C-5PSF]. Relatedly, one might speculate that the perception of
favoritism may be a source of concern for the judges themselves. See Naomi Jagoda &
Jacqueline Thomsen, Trump Judges Face Scrutiny over President’s Cases, THE HILL (Aug. 4,
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factors may widen the gap in influence between a Bush-appointed
judge and a Clinton-appointed judge.14 Third, because the DACA
rescission issue is a fairly technical legal question, one might expect
the general public to find court rulings especially informative. And
yet, fourth, given the political salience of the DACA program, some
people may want to believe that its rescission is lawful or unlawful,
and they may hold on to such a motivated belief despite contrary
information.15 These latter two factors may work against each other
in affecting the impact of a court ruling on people’s beliefs.
Two notes about the survey subjects are in order before preview-
ing the findings. First, because in these DACA cases the federal
courts have ruled against a Republican administration, this study
focuses only on the reactions of self-identified Republicans.16 A
similar configuration of cases in a Democratic administration would
2019, 8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/456013-trump-judges-face-scruti
ny-over-presidents-cases [https://perma.cc/D8EJ-RU3S] (“Federal judges nominated by Presi-
dent Trump are facing a major public test as they handle cases that involve Trump personally
or some of his most controversial policies,” and in particular, that “three recently appointed
district judges in D.C.—Trevor McFadden, Timothy Kelly and Carl Nichols—have found
themselves and their rulings under a magnifying glass as they deal with cases involving
Trump.”).
14. That is, both should increase credibility for the Bush-appointed judge, relative to the
Clinton-appointed judge (for the Republican survey subjects in this study). This relative
characterization is not meant to overlook the possibility that some people might perceive a
Bush-appointed judge to be not quite as sympathetic to the Trump Administration as, say, a
Trump-appointed judge. See Barnes, supra note 1. To date, however, no Trump-appointed
judge has authored a ruling in the DACA cases; nor has any Obama-appointed judge. That
is why this study focuses on a comparison of a Bush-appointed judge with a Clinton-appointed
judge.
15. These factors are stated broadly and might easily be subdivided or more specifically
named. For example, one might take this fourth factor and say that part of it is “confirmation
bias,” and another part “motivated cognition,” and another part “cognitive dissonance.” Such
variations might be interesting to investigate in future work, but this study only measures
overall net effects, and is not designed to tease apart these possibilities.
16. In assessing the credibility of judicial review, it seems most useful to observe whether
people’s beliefs change in response to court rulings against an administration of their own
party. This is not to suggest that all survey subjects support every action that the Trump
Administration takes. Although the data cannot distinguish subjects who generally support
the Trump Administration from those who do not, the study design does expressly distinguish
those who oppose DACA as a policy matter from those who do not (and each group is analyzed
separately). It also presents data both from the full sample of subjects who had self-identified
as Republican to the survey firm before taking this survey, as well as from a subsample of
subjects who continued to self-identify as Republican when asked during this survey (more
than two years into the Trump Administration). See infra Tables 1 & 2.
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be needed for a parallel study of how Democrats respond to an
unfavorable ruling. Second, these findings are not based on a
nationally representative sample; due to the recruitment method,
there is an overrepresentation of older subjects.17
The findings, in brief: Judicial credibility can vary based on the
political labeling of the judge. Telling these survey subjects that a
Bush-appointed judge ruled against the Trump Administration
exerted more influence on their beliefs than telling them that a
Clinton-appointed judge did so. The degree of influence seems lim-
ited in either case, however. Many subjects appeared to stick to
their prior beliefs about the legality of the Administration’s action
despite being told about rulings to the contrary by either judge.
Moreover, these prior beliefs correlate with subjects’ views on DACA
as a policy matter. Subjects who said that DACA is generally a bad
policy were less likely (than other subjects) to say that the rescission
was probably unlawful and much more likely to say that it was
probably lawful.
Part I will detail the survey design and present the data, and Part
II will discuss what these findings might teach us (or not) about the
political labeling of federal judges and about the credibility of
judicial review. The Conclusion will relate judicial credibility to
concerns of judicial legitimacy, situating these findings in a political
moment when numerous government actions are being blocked by
the lower federal courts—a time when their credibility is repeatedly
put to the test.
I. COMPARING JUDICIAL CREDIBILITY
The configuration of the DACA-rescission cases created an
opportunity to compare the influence of telling people that a ruling
against the government had been made by a judge appointed by
President George W. Bush,18 with that of telling people the same
17. The participants were recruited by the survey firm SurveyMonkey; the extent of
overrepresentation of older subjects is detailed below. See infra Part I.B.
18. Judge John Bates was appointed by President George W. Bush. Bates, John D., FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/bates-john-d [https://perma.cc/M756-QNWF].
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ruling had been made by a judge appointed by President Bill
Clinton.19
At the time these surveys were conducted (June 2019), four
federal district courts had ruled on the lawfulness of how the Trump
Administration tried to cancel the DACA program.20 In essence,
three of the district courts had ruled against this Administration,
issuing preliminary injunctions or partial relief in a way that put
the DACA program in a holding pattern.21 Among the appeals from
these rulings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
reached a decision largely affirming the court below and upholding
19. Judge William Alsup and Judge Nicholas Garaufis were both appointed by President
Bill Clinton. Alsup, William Haskel, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/alsup-
william-haskell [https://perma.cc/7KCS-GMLJ]; Garaufis, Nicholas, FED. JUD. CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/judges/garaufis-nicholas [https://perma.cc/3HJH-U75R]. Judge Alsup’s
decision more closely matches that of Judge Bates, in relevant aspects, and so for present
purposes all mentions of the “Clinton-appointed judge” in this Article can be taken to refer to
Judge Alsup.
20. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 249 (D.D.C. 2018) (Bates, J.), cert. before
judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 772, 779 (D. Md. 2018) (Titus, J.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in
part, 924 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2019); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437-38
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (Garaufis, J.), cert. before judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019); Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048-50 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(Alsup, J.), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). In the
District of Columbia case, Judge John Bates issued a further opinion after allowing the
government ninety days to remedy the defects in the rescission decision. NAACP v. Trump,
315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 473 (D.D.C. 2018), cert. before judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). 
21. Taken together, these courts’ orders required the government to continue processing
DACA renewals (with the proviso that renewal requests may be decided in an individualized
way), but did not require accepting new applications or granting advance parole. See NAACP
v. Trump, 321 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150 (D.D.C. 2018); Batalla Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 437;
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1048. On January 9, 2018, Judge Alsup granted
a preliminary injunction to this effect. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1048-49.
Judge Garaufis did likewise, on February 13, 2018. Batalla Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 437. On
August 17, 2018, Judge Bates partially stayed his order vacating the rescission, in a way that
matched the two preliminary injunctions. NAACP, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 146, 150 (“The Court
will stay its order as to new DACA applications and applications for advance parole, but not
as to renewal applications.”). It must be noted that another federal district court decided a
different DACA case in the reverse posture, with challengers attacking the lawfulness of the
program itself (rather than the rescission); although this judge signaled that he would find
DACA to be unlawful under the Administrative Procedures Act, he also declined to issue a
preliminary injunction against continuing the program. Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp.
3d 662, 742-43 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (Hanen, J.); see also Michael D. Shear, Federal Judge in Texas
Delivers Unexpected Victory for DACA Program, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/08/31/us/politics/texas-judge-daca.html [https://perma.cc/KE5D-NQPD].
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its remedy.22 One other federal district court had ruled in favor of
this Administration,23 but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit had reversed.24 Notably, when this survey was conducted,
the Supreme Court had not yet granted certiorari in these cases
(much less heard oral arguments or reached a decision).25
A. Survey Design
The surveys conveyed simplified information about the state of
these federal court rulings.26 One Bush-appointed judge and one
Clinton-appointed judge issued district court opinions that over-
lapped enough to be summarized in an identical way;27 in either
case, the judge could be fairly characterized in the survey text as
ruling “that the government had failed to show that the DACA
program is unlawful”; that “the government had failed to properly
explain its decision, as federal law requires”; and that therefore,
“the way the government tried to cancel the program was unlaw-
ful.”28 Other aspects of their rulings did not align, but this charac-
terization captures their shared bottom line, for purposes of this
study.29
22. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir.
2018). At the time of this survey, the District of Columbia (NAACP v. Trump) and New York
(Batalla Vidal v. Nielson) cases had not yet been decided on appeal.
23. Casa De Maryland, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 772. 
24. Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 690-91 (4th Cir.
2019).
25. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in three of the cases on June 28, 2018, after this
survey had been completed earlier in the month. See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d
209 (D.D.C. 2018), cert. before judgment granted, 2019 WL 2649836 (June 28, 2019) (No. 18-
588).
26. For this survey it was advantageous to convey true information rather than to invent
fictional accounts, given that these cases had a fairly high profile at the time. Thus, I chose
not to include scenarios in which an Obama-appointed or a Trump-appointed judge had
authored a ruling in these cases (as neither would have been true).
27. Again, the Bush-appointed judge was Judge John Bates in the District of Columbia
case (NAACP v. Trump), and the Clinton-appointed judge was Judge William Alsup in the
California case (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). See supra notes 18-
19.
28. See NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 460-61 (D.D.C. 2018), cert. before judgment
granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037-46 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).
29. For example, because Judge Bates had given the government a chance to revise its
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Two experimental conditions could thus be created, with identi-
cal information except for which president appointed the judge
making the ruling. I will refer to these as the {Bush judge} and
{Clinton judge} conditions. For the {No ruling} condition, in which
no information is revealed about any courts’ rulings, the legal
conclusions noted above are instead attributed to the challengers in
the lawsuits, as arguments they raised. Each survey subject sees
only one of the three conditions in this study’s between-subject
design.
Here is what the subjects experience as they take the survey.
They first encounter a very brief explanation of the DACA program.
The same phrasing is used for all survey subjects:
In 2012, during the Obama Administration, the federal govern-
ment started a program for undocumented immigrants who
arrived in the United States as a child, before the age of 16.
The program is called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or
DACA, and its participants are sometimes called “Dreamers.”
The program offers work permits and protection from deporta-
tion, for renewable two-year periods.
In 2017, during the Trump Administration, the federal govern-
ment announced that it would cancel the DACA program.
As with other information given in the survey, this description of
DACA eligibility is simplified; listing all the other eligibility crite-
ria would have required a long block of text that risked losing the
attention of the survey subjects.30 The DACA program has been
heavily covered in the media, and this brief description is aimed at
reminding subjects of its general contours.
rationales for the rescission, his (later) opinion took those revisions into account. See supra
note 20. And, as noted above, Judge Alsup ordered a preliminary injunction, whereas Judge
Bates ordered vacatur of the rescission decision, subject to a partial stay. See supra notes 20-
21.
30. It is possible that some of the omitted details (such as needing to be under age 31 on
June 15, 2012, or the criminal-record requirements) might have affected how some subjects
would answer the policy-preference question. But their answers to that question are not an
outcome of interest in this study; they are, instead, used for categorizing the subjects into
subsamples. 
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The subjects are then asked to answer a question about their
policy preference—whether they think the DACA program is
“generally a good [or bad] policy.”31 Notably, at this point, the survey
has not mentioned the court cases; nor is there any sign yet that the
survey will ask about the lawfulness of the canceling of the pro-
gram.32 Only after the subjects have registered their policy prefer-
ences can they proceed to the next page, which begins to present
information about the cases.33
At this point, the three sets of subjects receive different informa-
tion about the cases.34 Those subjects randomized into either the
{Bush judge} or {Clinton judge} conditions are told that the judge
ruled against the government, as shown below.35 These two condi-
tions have identical wording, aside from the words “George W.
Bush” and “Bill Clinton.”
{Bush judge} or {Clinton judge}
Several lawsuits are now challenging the government’s decision
to cancel the DACA program. In these cases, the government has
argued that the program is unlawful. But the government has
been losing these cases.
31. They could choose among the options “I think the DACA program is generally a good
policy,” “I think the DACA program is generally a bad policy,” and “I have not formed a view
on this.” 
32. It is possible that for some subjects, their policy preference will be affected by their
beliefs about the legality of DACA itself (as informed by sources outside the survey). But to
be clear, it is not this study’s purpose to test such a possibility (say, by measuring whether
a favorable court ruling influences people’s support for a given substantive policy), sometimes
called an “endorsement” effect, in the literature. See, e.g., Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist,
The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public Opinion: Comparing Experimental and
Observational Methods, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 223-27 (2016) (measuring the “endorsement”
effects of major U.S. Supreme Court rulings; that is, whether rulings upholding the legality
of certain laws or government actions embodying certain policies can “increase (or decrease)
overall support for these policies” in public opinion).
33. Subjects are required to answer every question, and they cannot return to a prior page
to change their answers. 
34. In each of the three conditions, after reading their respective versions of the
description the subjects are asked a comprehension question; as noted below, those who fail
this check are excluded from the sample.
35. The labels in curly brackets here are only for expositional purposes; they do not
appear on the survey.
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For example, a federal judge appointed by President George W.
Bush [or Bill Clinton] ruled that the government had failed to
show that the DACA program is unlawful. He also ruled that the
government had failed to properly explain its decision, as federal
law requires.
The judge concluded, therefore, that the way the government tried
to cancel the program was unlawful.
So far, the appeals courts have affirmed rulings like these. The
Supreme Court has not yet heard the issue.
Note that the description mentions the Bush-appointed or
Clinton-appointed judge only as one example of a federal court
ruling against this Administration.36 This phrasing may tend to
impress more firmly upon readers that the Trump Administration’s
attempt to cancel DACA has been deemed unlawful by multiple
federal courts.37 Yet note that the description may also create some
room for subjects to hold the contrary view, by mentioning that the
Supreme Court has not yet had the final word.38
Meanwhile, those subjects in the {No ruling} condition, which
does not mention any courts’ rulings at all, are instead told that the
challengers have presented certain reasons for ruling against the
Administration—reasons that mirror the description of the court
ruling in the {Bush judge} and {Clinton judge} conditions. This
design allows a comparison between the two conditions that
36. Note also that no political-affiliation information is given about any other courts
mentioned. This phrasing thus avoids distracting from the political labeling of the mentioned
district judge; but, the tradeoff is that subjects are left to imagine what they will about the
makeup of those other courts. To speculate, it is possible that the mention of a Bush-
appointed district judge might conjure up a different mental impression of the other courts
ruling the same way, than the mention of a Clinton-appointed district judge.
37. This impression is also reinforced by what the phrasing does not mention: the one
district court initially ruling the other way (before being reversed on appeal) on the lawfulness
of the canceling of DACA; and, as noted above, the Texas case, which is in the reverse posture
of challenging the lawfulness of the DACA program in the first place (though that legal
question is also relevant to the other cases). See Shear, supra note 21; supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
38. It is possible to imagine a description that omitted this fact, but then many subjects
would likely be left wondering, “So what did the Supreme Court say?” Recall that at the time
of the survey, the Supreme Court had not yet granted certiorari in these cases.
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describe the court rulings with one that does not, while holding
roughly constant the presence of the legal arguments on both sides.
{No ruling}
Several lawsuits are now challenging the government’s decision
to cancel the DACA program. In these cases, the government has
argued that the program is unlawful.
The challengers argue that the government has failed to show
that the DACA program is unlawful. They also argue that the
government has failed to properly explain its decision, as federal
law requires.
They argue, therefore, that the way the government tried to cancel
the program was unlawful.
The survey then asked the subjects the principal question of
interest: whether they think that the Administration’s attempt to
rescind DACA is lawful or unlawful. Their three choices are: “I think
that the way the government tried to cancel the program was
probably unlawful,” “I think that the way the government tried to
cancel the program was probably lawful,” and “I have not formed a
view on this.”39 The question and the three options are identical in
the {Bush judge}, {Clinton judge}, and {No ruling} conditions.40
Recall that by the time the subjects reach this principal question,
they have already answered a separate question about their policy
preferences; this sequencing helps make clear that the new question
(about the lawfulness of the way the government tried to cancel the
39. In the analysis to follow, these answers will occasionally be referred in shorthand as
the “unlawful,” “lawful,” or “no view” positions. But it is useful to remember that the actual
phrasing of the answer options is “probably unlawful” or “probably lawful.” This phrasing was
chosen to be more user-friendly for the survey subjects, drawing on colloquial usage (for
example, “I think that’s probably true”) and also allowing some leeway by not requiring
certainty. This seemed useful given the somewhat technical nature of the issue (the
lawfulness of the attempted canceling of DACA), and the lack of other facts or argumentation
given. The phrasing of “I have not formed a view on this” was also meant to be more user-
friendly than “I do not know.”
40. Note that the question does not mention the courts; the subjects in the {No ruling}
condition have not yet read anything about the court rulings at this point. 
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DACA program) is distinct from the prior question (about whether
the program is a good or bad policy).41
B. Survey Population
The survey subjects are adults from across the United States who
have self-identified as Republicans. All are volunteers recruited by
the survey firm SurveyMonkey, which distributed the surveys
online.42 The sample is screened to exclude any subjects who have
attended law school, who have recently answered another survey
about DACA, who fail the comprehension check, who say they did
not take the survey seriously, or who do not answer all the ques-
tions on the survey.43 In total, 1259 subjects are included, of whom
50 percent are female.44 It should be emphasized that this is not a
nationally representative sample. Most notably, due to the way
SurveyMonkey recruits subjects and also due to this study’s focus
on self-identified Republicans, older subjects are overrepresented.45
In this study, 62 percent of the subjects are over sixty years old. For
comparison, 57 percent of the likely voter pool among Republicans
is aged fifty or older.46
41. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
42. They are volunteers in the sense that they do not receive a time-based wage, nor
monetary pay for each survey. Rather, they receive compensation in the form of either
donations to a charity, entry in a sweepstakes contest, or reward points that can be redeemed
for goods. See Rewards, SURVEYMONKEY, https://www.surveymonkey.com/rewards [https://
perma.cc/6XXA-6EYY]. This recruitment method raises the possibility that these subjects are
more charitably minded (or more interested in the sweepstakes or rewards prizes on offer)
than the broader population.
43. Aside from the comprehension check, these are posed as questions on the final follow-
up page, after the subjects have answered the substantive questions. There is also a standard
consent page at the start of the survey, where subjects have to click “Agree” in order to
proceed.
44. Of the 1259 total subjects, 625 are female.
45. SurveyMonkey is generally able to ensure an age distribution that roughly tracks the
census, but this was not an option for a sample as large as in this study, given that the
population was already limited to self-identified Republicans. Gender balancing was available,
however, and was applied.
46. PEW RESEARCH CTR., WIDE GENDER GAP, GROWING EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE IN VOTERS’
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 25 (2018), https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/wide-gender-gap-
growing-educational-divide-in-voters-party-identification/ [https://perma.cc/ZJG9-BGAJ]
(“Nearly six-in-ten Republican and Republican-leaning voters (57%) are ages 50 and older,
compared with 42% who are under 50.”).
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All of these subjects self-identified as Republicans at the time of
their original recruitment for SurveyMonkey’s proprietary panel.
The advantage of relying on this classifier is that there is no way for
it to be affected by the contents of this survey. And yet, because it
also seems useful to recognize that some subjects may have revised
their affiliation, a follow-up question in the survey asks anew
whether they identify as Republican, Democrat, Independent, or
Other.47 More than four out of five answered that they (still) identify
as Republican.48 When the sample is limited to only these subjects,
the overall results remain essentially the same, as seen in Table 2,
with one exception noted below. I have chosen to focus on presenting
results based on the original classifier, as seen in Table 1, because
it is sure to be unaffected by what this survey says about DACA and
the courts.49
Recall that the reason for focusing on Republican survey subjects
in this study is that, in these particular cases, the federal courts are
ruling against a Republican administration’s action.50 A parallel
study focusing on Democrats might be possible someday, if multiple
judges appointed by differing-party presidents were to rule the same
way against a Democratic administration, on an issue of similar
political salience.51
47. There is also an open-ended text box for elaboration; typical entries include mentions
of being libertarian or conservative (despite no longer identifying as Republican).
48. Nearly all of the rest answered Independent or Other. Fewer than 1 percent identified
as Democrat. The sample size of subjects who no longer identify as Republican is unfortu-
nately too small for any useful statistical analysis. Also, information about when the subjects
originally identified themselves to SurveyMonkey as Republican is not available; this is one
disadvantage of analyzing the full sample, relative to analyzing the subsample of those who
still identify as Republican when asked in the survey itself. This also suggests that the study
is likely missing people who now identify as Republican but did not at the time they were
originally asked by SurveyMonkey.
49. It would have been possible to avoid such endogeneity by asking about political
affiliation before presenting the information about DACA, but such an ordering would also
risk priming the subjects in a partisan way from the get-go. As the survey is designed, the
subjects do not know that they have been chosen for the sample because they previously self-
identified as Republicans. Cf. Nsikan Akpan, How Seeing a Political Logo Can Impair Your
Understanding of Facts, PBS: NEWSHOUR (Sept. 3, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.pbs.org/news
hour/science/how-seeing-a-political-logo-can-impair-your-understanding-of-facts [https://
perma.cc/U3FT-8W7G] (explaining the results of a recent study that showed “[w]hen
reminded of our partisan identity, we promote ideas that our [sic] consistent with our
attitudes and social beliefs,” even in spite of legitimate facts contrary to those ideas).
50. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
51. The closest recent analogue would seem to be the DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents
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Table 1. Subjects Originally Identifying as Republican
A. DACA Opponents
Views of DACA Rescission
Probably
unlawful
Probably
lawful
No view N
Bush judge 8.7 % 61.3 % 30.0 % 287
Clinton judge 6.6 % 70.9 % 22.5 % 244
No ruling 3.1 % 77.3 % 19.6 % 286
B. Everyone Else
Views of DACA Rescission
Probably
unlawful
Probably
lawful
No view N
Bush judge 46.3 % 13.1 % 40.6 % 160
Clinton judge 29.0 % 29.0 % 41.9 % 155
No ruling 28.3 % 29.1 % 42.5 % 127
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents) case brought against the Obama Admin-
istration, but in that instance all the judges who ruled or voted against the Administration
(that is, the district judge and the two judges in the majority on the Fifth Circuit panel) were
appointed by Republican presidents; thus, no comparison is possible between judges ruling
the same way but appointed by differing-party presidents. Judge Andrew Hanen, a Bush
nominee, wrote the district court opinion. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604
(S.D. Tex. 2015); Hanen, Andrew S., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/ history/judges/hanen-
andrew-s [https://perma.cc/G9T6-BRBH]. Judge Jerry Smith, a Bush nominee, wrote the Fifth
Circuit opinion; Judge Jennifer Elrod, a Reagan nominee, joined the majority. Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015); Elrod, Jennifer Walker, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/elrod-jennifer-walker [https://perma.cc/RK59-UZMU];
Smith, Jerry Edwin, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/smith-jerry-edwin
[https://perma.cc/N4BE-CKLL]. The Supreme Court affirmed, by an equally divided court, and
thus the votes are unknown (though one might speculate). United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
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Table 2. Subjects Still Identifying as Republican
A. DACA Opponents
Views of DACA Rescission
Probably
unlawful
Probably
lawful
No view N
Bush judge 9.5 % 59.8 % 30.7 % 241
Clinton judge 6.9 % 70.3 % 22.8 % 202
No ruling 2.2 % 77.9 % 19.9 % 226
B. Everyone Else
Views of DACA Rescission
Probably
unlawful
Probably
lawful
No view N
Bush judge 46.8 % 14.4 % 38.8 % 139
Clinton judge 28.2 % 29.0 % 42.7 % 131
No ruling 28.3 % 29.3 % 42.4 % 99
C. Findings
How much does informing people about these court rulings affect
whether they think the government action is lawful or unlawful?
Does the degree of influence vary, depending on whether the judge
making the specified ruling is labeled a “Bush judge” or a “Clinton
judge”? And does this all depend on what someone thinks of DACA
as a policy matter in the first place?
These questions can be answered by comparing across the three
conditions—{Bush judge}, {Clinton judge}, and {No ruling}—while
also distinguishing those who oppose DACA from those who do not.
Given that more than half (65 percent) of the sample answered “I
think DACA is generally a bad policy,” the closest to an equal
division is between those subjects (call them “DACA Opponents”)
and the rest, who answered either “I think DACA is generally a good
policy” or “I have not formed a view on this” (call them “Everyone
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Else”).52 For reasons of sample size, I am presenting the analysis
with these two latter groups combined into one. Thus, the main
comparisons of interest will be across the three conditions for the
DACA Opponents and, separately, across the three conditions for
Everyone Else.
The findings can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. The following
discussion will analyze the responses of the survey subjects as
broken down into the two groups just described, DACA Opponents
and Everyone Else. The responses of DACA Opponents are shown
in panel A, and the responses of Everyone Else are shown in panel
B, of each Table. As noted, the exposition here will focus on the full
sample in Table 1 (of subjects who originally self-identified to
SurveyMonkey as being Republican), rather than the subsample in
Table 2 (of subjects who continued to identify as Republican when
asked during this survey); aside from one exception addressed
below, the results are essentially the same.
The simplest way to address the question of whether it matters
how a judge is labeled is to directly compare the {Bush judge} and
{Clinton judge} conditions.53 Among the DACA Opponents, a large
majority of subjects answered that the Trump Administration’s
rescission of DACA was probably lawful—but fewer were willing to
say so when they were told that a Bush-appointed judge had ruled
52. Note again that the DACA policy preference question is asked (on a prior survey page)
before the lawfulness question; moreover, in the {No ruling} condition, the court rulings
information is only presented after the lawfulness question (on a separate page). See supra
notes 36-38 and accompanying text. It remains possible that for some subjects, one’s policy
view might be influenced by one’s (externally informed) views about the lawfulness of the
DACA program itself. For example, the DACA Opponents group may include some subjects
who think that the program is bad policy in part because they already think it is unlawful to
begin with; one might imagine such subjects being either less responsive to the court rulings
(because their prior beliefs about the legality of DACA or of its rescission are more firmly
established), or more responsive (because the informational impact of the contrary court
rulings is greater), relative to other subjects who consider DACA to be a bad policy solely for
other reasons, or who do not hold prior beliefs about legality. This study has not asked
subjects to explain why they think DACA is generally a good or bad policy, and thus does not
distinguish among possible motivations within the DACA Opponents group.
53. The exposition here will speak of comparing the perceived credibility of the Bush-
appointed judge with that of the Clinton-appointed judge; but as explained below, given the
text of the survey it would be more precise (though more tedious) to speak of the perceived
credibility of the whole group of federal courts mentioned (including the Bush-appointed or
Clinton-appointed judge) relative to the credibility of the Trump Administration as the losing
litigant. See infra Part II.A.
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to the contrary, declaring the rescission unlawful, than when told
that a Clinton-appointed judge had done so. As panel A in Table 1
reports, 61 percent of these subjects said that the rescission was
probably lawful in the {Bush judge} condition as compared to 71
percent in the {Clinton judge} condition.54 It thus appears that some
subjects who would have said that the rescission was probably
lawful, despite hearing that a Clinton-appointed judge had ruled to
the contrary, were nonetheless influenced enough by a Bush-
appointed judge’s identical ruling to shift away from that belief.55 It
is not apparent, however, that the Bush-appointed judge was much
more influential than the Clinton-appointed judge in easing this
group’s reluctance to say that the DACA rescission was probably
unlawful; similarly small shares said so, 9 percent and 7 percent in
the {Bush judge} and {Clinton judge} conditions, respectively.56
For Everyone Else, views of legality also varied depending on how
the judge was politically identified: Fewer said that the rescission
was probably lawful, and more said it was probably unlawful, when
they were told that a Bush-appointed judge had declared it unlawful
than when told that a Clinton-appointed judge had done so. As
panel B in Table 1 reports, 46 percent said that the rescission was
probably unlawful in the {Bush judge} condition as compared to 29
percent in the {Clinton judge} condition;57 and 13 percent said it was
probably lawful in the {Bush judge} condition, as compared to 29
percent in the {Clinton judge} condition.58 It thus appears that some
subjects who would have said that the rescission was probably
lawful, despite a Clinton-appointed judge’s contrary ruling, were
nonetheless influenced enough by a Bush-appointed judge’s ruling
to shift away from that position. And it also appears that some
subjects who would have credited a Bush-appointed judge’s ruling,
enough to say that they believed that the rescission was probably
unlawful, did not find the same credibility in an identical ruling by
a Clinton-appointed judge.
54. ǘ2(1, N = 531) = 5.370, p = 0.020.
55. Throughout, I refer to differences across conditions casually using terms such as
“shift,” “rise,” or “fall”; but to be clear, this study uses a between-subject and not a within-
subject design, and each subject only sees one condition.
56. ǘ2(1, N = 531) = 0.858, p = 0.354.
57. ǘ2(1, N = 315) = 9.929, p = 0.002.
58. ǘ2(1, N = 315) = 12.028, p < 0.001.
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Taken together, these contrasts between the {Bush judge} and
{Clinton judge} conditions offer the most straightforward evidence
that, for this study’s population of self-identified Republicans,
beliefs about the legality of the Trump Administration’s actions can
differ depending on whether a court ruling is said to come from a
“Bush judge” or a “Clinton judge.” It may also be notable that in
only one of these subsamples—the Everyone Else group in the {Bush
judge} condition—did more subjects say that the rescission was
probably unlawful (46 percent) than say that it was probably lawful
(13 percent), after hearing that a federal judge had ruled it to be
unlawful.
Each of these two conditions can also be compared with the {No
ruling} condition. This is the condition that presents subjects with
background information about the lawsuits but does not say how the
courts have ruled (though it is possible that some subjects may have
heard about the rulings from sources external to the survey).
Comparisons between this condition and the two judge-specific
conditions can be interpreted as the impact of expressly giving
information about how the courts have ruled, relative to only
describing the lawsuit and the parties’ litigating positions.
In the {No ruling} condition, the DACA Opponents and Everyone
Else groups reported strikingly different beliefs about the lawful-
ness of the government action. As seen in panel A in Table 1, 77
percent of those opposing DACA responded that the Trump Adminis-
tration’s rescission is probably lawful, and only 3 percent responded
that it is probably unlawful, when told only about the existence of
the lawsuits but not about how the courts have ruled. By contrast,
roughly equal shares among Everyone Else responded that rescind-
ing DACA is probably lawful or probably unlawful—29 percent and
28 percent, respectively, as seen in panel B in Table 1.
When told about the Bush-appointed judge’s ruling, somewhat
fewer of the DACA Opponents remained willing to maintain that
the government action is probably lawful, falling from 77 percent in
the {No ruling} condition to 61 percent in the {Bush judge} condition,
as seen in panel A in Table 1.59 There is also a shift toward respond-
ing that it is probably unlawful, rising from 3 percent to 9 percent,
59. ǘ2(1, N = 573) = 17.122, p < 0.001.
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respectively.60 Meanwhile, among Everyone Else, the 29 percent in
the {No ruling} condition who answered that it is probably lawful
falls to 13 percent in the {Bush judge} condition,61 and the 28
percent answering that the government action is probably unlawful
rises to 46 percent, as seen in panel B in Table 1.62 These shifts
provide evidence of the informational impact of learning about the
court rulings when a Bush-appointed judge is specified, relative to
hearing only about the parties’ litigating positions.
There is less evidence, however, of the influence of telling subjects
about the court rulings when a Clinton-appointed judge is specified.
For the DACA Opponents, the {Clinton judge} condition seems to
show little change from the {No ruling} condition. As seen in panel
A in Table 1, the share responding that the government action is
probably unlawful seems to rise somewhat from 3 percent to 7
percent,63 and the share responding that it is probably lawful seems
to fall somewhat from 77 percent to 71 percent64—but one cannot
say either with much confidence, as these differences are not
statistically significant at the conventional level.65 It should be
noted that here one result differs if the sample is limited to only
those subjects who continued to self-identify as Republican.66 Among
them, as seen in panel A in Table 2, the share saying the rescission
is probably unlawful rises instead from 2 percent to 7 percent, a
difference that is statistically significant at the conventional level;67
60. ǘ2(1, N = 573) = 7.945, p = 0.005.
61. ǘ2(1, N = 287) = 11.253, p < 0.001.
62. ǘ2(1, N = 287) = 9.601, p = 0.002.
63. ǘ2(1, N = 530) = 3.408, p = 0.065.
64. ǘ2(1, N = 530) = 2.802, p = 0.094.
65. By conventional level, I mean the p = 0.05 cutoff. The reader is also welcome to bypass
this convention and assess statistical confidence directly from the p-values reported in these
notes. A familiar reminder is also in order, that the lack of a statistically significant effect
represents a lack of evidence—and is not itself evidence of no effect.
66. For a discussion about how many survey subjects who self-identified as Republicans
at the original time of their recruitment by SurveyMonkey continue to identify as such at the
time of this survey, and about why this exposition focuses on the original classification, see
supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
67. ǘ2(1, N = 428) = 5.598, p = 0.018. That the gap between 2 percent and 7 percent in the
subsample of subjects who still identify as Republican is statistically significant, and yet the
gap between 3 percent and 7 percent in the full sample is not statistically significant, should
not be interpreted as evidence of a substantive difference between the subsample and the full
sample; needless to say, this study does not have the statistical power to distinguish between
2 percent and 3 percent.
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this suggests that subjects in the subsample assigned less credibility
to the plaintiffs than to the Clinton-appointed judge. Meanwhile,
among Everyone Else, the share answering that the rescission is
probably unlawful does not appear to change, from 28 percent in the
{No ruling} condition to 29 percent in the {Clinton judge} condition,
as seen in panel B in Table 1.68 The share saying that it is probably
lawful also seems unchanged, from 29 percent in the {No ruling}
condition to 29 percent in the {Clinton judge} condition.69
What might account for the differences observed between the
{Bush judge} and {Clinton judge} conditions—when the only thing
that varies between the two scenarios are the words “George W.
Bush” and “Bill Clinton” in describing the appointment of the
district judge? Recall the mechanisms suggested in the Introduction:
Some subjects may be assigning more weight to the judge ruling
against an administration of the same perceived party. Or, some
subjects may be assigning more influential weight to the ruling of
a Bush-appointed judge because he is perceived to be a Republi-
can—and thus a member of a trusted in-group, perhaps likely to
share one’s own legal philosophy or ideology. A related possibility is
that, for some subjects, the mention of the Clinton appointment
primes a more partisan reaction, perhaps causing them to adhere
more closely to their original motivated beliefs.
This study is not designed to distinguish among these possibilities
or to sort out their interactions, but it seems sensible to speculate
that they might coexist within a given sample or even within the
same individual subject. Note that this study measures only
aggregate differences among groups of subjects; it does not observe
how any individual subject’s views respond to differing information
(as each subject only sees one condition). Although such group
differences are revealing, they may also mask heterogeneity within
each group. For example, although it may be tempting to infer that
a Clinton-appointed judge has faint credibility with these survey
subjects, it is also possible that the elusiveness of an aggregate
effect is due to the offsetting of a positive influence for some subjects
by an oppositional reaction (a sort of negative credibility) among
others.
68. ǘ2(1, N = 282) = 0.016, p = 0.899.
69. ǘ2(1, N = 282) = 0.000, p = 0.985.
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II. BUSH JUDGES, CLINTON JUDGES?
These findings offer evidence that beliefs about the legality of a
government action can be differently influenced by hearing that a
Bush-appointed judge, as opposed to a Clinton-appointed judge, has
ruled against the government. To better understand what we can
learn (or not) from these findings, it may be useful to begin by
articulating more precisely just whose credibility is being observed
here. The discussion will then turn to important limitations of this
study, including features that might not generalize to alternative
study designs or to new contexts.
A. Whose Credibility?
In this study, judicial credibility is a relative measure. Given the
nature of these DACA cases, each survey subject is implicitly
weighing the perceived credibility of the Bush-appointed judge, of
the Clinton-appointed judge, or of the challengers against the
perceived credibility of the Trump Administration. It may thus be
more precise to say that what we are observing here is the credibil-
ity of judicial review.70
In addition, recall that several courts are mentioned in each of the
judicial scenarios. The judge who is identified as Bush-appointed or
Clinton-appointed (who made the individual ruling described in
detail) has the spotlight, but the appeals courts (who agree) and the
70. One upshot is that this complicates how we should interpret any comparisons between
the two groups of subjects, the DACA Opponents (those who said that DACA is generally bad
as a policy matter) and Everyone Else (those who said that DACA is generally a good policy,
or who expressed no view). Comparing across the randomized conditions within each group
is fairly straightforward. Although the survey subjects no doubt assign varying amounts of
credibility to the Administration, we can expect the averages to be similar across conditions.
Thus, any differences across conditions can be seen as differences in the average credibility
assigned to the Bush-appointed judge, to the Clinton-appointed judge, or to the challengers.
When comparing between the two groups, however, we must fall back on the relative concept.
The reason is that the DACA Opponents might assign, on average, a different amount of
credibility to this Administration than does Everyone Else. Unless we assume away such a
possibility, the most we can learn is how the credibility of judicial review (that is, the courts’
credibility relative to the Administration’s) varies between the groups. That is, we cannot say
that the numbers show how the average credibility of the Bush-appointed judge or the
Clinton-appointed judge (or of the challengers) differs between the two groups.
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Supreme Court (which has not yet taken up the issue) are also
mentioned.71 Thus, the observations may be understood as relating
to the credibility of this bundle of courts and the status of their
decisions collectively.72 To be clear, however, the only thing that
varies between the {Bush judge} and {Clinton judge} conditions is
the name of the appointing president of that one district judge.
B. Other Contexts?
As with any such study, the effects measured here are specific to
the sampled population, to the social and political climate of the
time, and to the details of the survey design. For these familiar
reasons, external validity and generalizability are always open to
question; in that spirit, and to help situate this study’s findings, it
may be useful to highlight some features specific to this study’s
context and design that may be likely to differ in other settings or
in other studies.
First, the central comparison here is between a Bush-appointed
judge and a Clinton-appointed judge. One might readily imagine a
more pronounced contrast in another study, should real events
make possible a similar comparison between an Obama-appointed
judge and a Trump-appointed judge. For example, for some subjects,
hearing that a Trump-appointed judge has ruled against the Trump
Administration may be more telling than hearing that a Bush-
appointed judge has done so.73 Or some may simply tend to believe
71. Except in the {No ruling} condition, which does not mention any courts’ rulings. See
supra Part I.A. In theory, there is also the possible complication that the DACA Opponents
and Everyone Else groups are assigning, on average, different amounts of credibility to the
challengers in the {No ruling} condition. If so, the cautionary note about comparing across
groups applies here too. But this would not be much of a worry if one doubted that many
subjects would have any reason to give the challengers much credibility; the challengers
(states, nonprofits, and universities) are not identified in the survey scenario, and their
argument is only described in a minimal way.
72. One might easily imagine that there is heterogeneity in how the survey subjects
consider this bundle of courts: some may be focusing on the individual judge, some on the
appeals courts, and some on the lack of any final word from the Supreme Court. I chose to
mention all of these courts because it would seem natural for subjects to wonder, upon
hearing only about one district judge’s ruling, what happened in other cases, or on appeal.
73. See, e.g., Jagoda & Thomsen, supra note 13 (describing special attention paid to
Trump-appointed judges in cases against the administration); Carrie Johnson, Trump’s
Impact on Federal Courts: Judicial Nominees by the Numbers, NPR (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:01 AM),
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a Trump-appointed judge more than a Bush-appointed judge (or a
Clinton-appointed judge more than an Obama-appointed judge).74
Moreover, it is worth a reminder that in this study design judicial
credibility is assessed relative to the perceived credibility of the
government, which may also vary across time.
Second, the rescission of DACA is a salient and politicized issue
in the minds of many people. For issues that are more obscure or
less political, one might speculate that the public’s beliefs about the
lawfulness of government action might be more malleable and thus
more open to influence by a judicial ruling (imagine a study about
a ruling that a highway transportation regulation was rescinded
without proper explanation).75 The politicized nature of the current
DACA discourse may also tend to widen the gap in perceived
credibility between the two judges, because it may seem less infor-
mative when a Clinton-appointed judge rules against the Adminis-
tration and more telling when a Bush-appointed judge rules that
way (relative to rulings on a less politicized issue).
Third, there is the nature of the legal judgment at hand: One
might expect nonlawyers to have weaker prior beliefs about a more
technical legal question, such as the procedural propriety of the
DACA rescission at issue here. Asking them instead to assess a
question of fact based on some evidence presented, or a normative
question (should DACA be illegal?), or even a positive legal question
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/05/747013608/trumps-impact-on-federal-courts-judicial-
nominees-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/5QR7-25W3] (quoting Russell Wheeler of the
Brookings Institution as saying, about Trump-appointed judges, that “[w]hen you replace a
70-year-old George W. Bush appointee who is slightly to the right of center with a 45-year-old
movement conservative, obviously you’re not trading apples for apples”).
74. As noted, these differential assignments of credibility may have various psychological
origins, such as an expectation of sharing a legal philosophy or ideology. Cf. Will Baude &
Ryan D. Doerfler, Arguing with Friends, 117 MICH. L. REV. 319 (2018) (arguing that judges
should find more informative the views of those with similar methodological or ideological
approaches). The imagined differences could also go the other way, of course; one might imag-
ine narrower gaps between the hypothetical {Obama judge} and {Trump judge} conditions than
between the {Clinton judge} and {Bush judge} conditions, if subjects tended to give less credi-
bility to a Trump-appointed judge than to a Bush-appointed judge, or more credibility to an
Obama-appointed judge than to a Clinton-appointed judge.
75. Cf. David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence
from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 771-75 (2012) (exploring the contrast
between low-salience and high-salience cases in how the public might psychologically respond
to being told about a Supreme Court ruling); id. at 782 (“[I]n high-salience cases there is little
chance the [Supreme] Court can convince opponents.”).
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on which people might have stronger prior beliefs (is there a
constitutional right to an abortion?), might well result in less re-
sponsiveness to a court ruling.76 Moreover, the scenario in this study
says little about how to assess the lawfulness of the government’s
action, and it seems possible that a different design offering more
guidance might prompt more subjects to depart from their prior
beliefs; yet, more guidance might also diminish a tendency to defer
to the courts. And the fact that this survey presents both sides’
arguments,77 if only in a cursory way, might also create more room
to align with whichever side the subject might otherwise favor.78
Finally, there are devils in the details of the posture of the DACA
cases at the time of this study: the Supreme Court had not yet
granted certiorari in these cases; and thus, the scenario says that
the Court has “not yet heard the issue”—which to some subjects
may have signaled that the lower courts’ rulings are not authorita-
tive or that the legal issue remains very much an open question.
Furthermore, the scenarios here do not explain the consequences of
the courts’ rulings, in part because the preliminary injunctions are
somewhat complicated in these DACA cases. It seems possible that
in another context, clearly identifying the stakes of judicial review
might more strongly motivate beliefs about legality that align with
the consequences that subjects prefer.79
76. And it seems plausible that strongly motivated beliefs might attach to issues at the
intersection of law and fact—say, questions of fact with implications for the law. Professor
Larsen offers notable illustrations. Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of
Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 202-18 (2018). Furthermore, there is the possibility
that an issue’s complexity may affect someone’s willingness to grant credibility to a judicial
ruling. Cf. Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Per-
spective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 22 n.101 (2016) (“If complexity may serve to enhance legitimacy,
there is nevertheless bound to be a point when complexity begins to undermine legitimacy.”).
77. For a recent discussion of one-sided vs. two-sided framing, see Linos & Twist, supra
note 32, at 225-32.
78. See id. at 230 (“[I]ndividuals who receive two-sided, competing frames are more likely
to retain their original views.”). And, as already noted, the cases (and hence the survey) pit
the government’s credibility against that of the courts. See supra Part I. One might expect to
find much more apparent influence in a study about a court ruling in, say, a private lawsuit.
79. But it is not obvious whether explaining the actual half-measure remedy in this case
would have done so (recall that two resulting preliminary injunctions and a partial stay of
vacatur in effect put DACA in a holding pattern, in which the government was accepting
renewals but not new applications), given that an uninformed subject might have imagined
a more extreme consequence of ruling that rescission is unlawful (namely, DACA being
allowed to operate at full force). For a fuller description of the dynamics by which the district
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C. Further Limitations
Two further limitations are worth emphasizing for good measure.
First, a survey-based study like this is inherently artificial in ways
that limit external validity. For one thing, it must deliver the rel-
evant information directly. Thus, even if this survey’s wording
approximates what one might read on a basic newswire, it is still
quite unlike the usual ways people might otherwise have learned of
these cases. It is not obvious whether one should expect less or more
influence when such information appears in a natural nonsurvey
setting. The typical worry is that surveys relatively overstate such
effects because in real life people do not always hear or internalize
the news.80 And yet, the impact of information might be dampened
in a survey due to the subjects’ doubts about its trustworthiness,
coming from an anonymous online survey interface.
Second, this study is a single snapshot; it is not a time-lapse
movie. Based on these data there is no telling whether the degree of
influence of hearing that a certain federal judge has ruled a certain
way would have been higher, lower, or about the same, at any other
point in time. Even if it seems intuitive that the harsh criticisms of
the courts in today’s political rhetoric—and especially the high-
profile denunciations of “Obama judges”81—may be making a differ-
ence, this study simply does not measure changes over time.
CONCLUSION: CREDIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY
It may emphatically be the province of the courts to say what the
law is,82 but does the public believe them when they do? A cynic
might be surprised to see that telling these survey subjects about
the court rulings had any influence at all, in light of polling data
showing that two-thirds of American voters think federal judges
courts converged on this particular holding pattern, see Bert I. Huang, Coordinating
Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
80. For a state-of-the-art analysis of how real-world news and survey-experiment news
may differ in informational impact, see Linos & Twist, supra note 32.
81. See Trump, supra note 8.
82. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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today are ruling more and more based on their political views.83
Such a cynic might also have assumed that survey subjects would
mostly stick to their motivated beliefs on such a politically salient
issue.84
But an idealist who expected that most people would defer to the
rulings of the federal courts, especially in reviewing the legality of
a government action, might be a bit troubled by these findings. Even
recognizing that government officers regularly acquiesce to rulings
that they (or the public) believe the courts got wrong, this idealist
might see judicial credibility in individual cases as one source of the
“sociological legitimacy” of the federal courts in the first place:85 a
court’s ability to influence people’s beliefs may promote the actual
acceptance of its rulings (rather than mere acquiescence, a softer
foundation for compliance), and rulings that seem correct to people
may bolster public support for the courts over time.86 The idealist
may imagine that both effects, of inducing acceptance of specific
rulings and of building a reservoir of general respect, would be
especially valuable for those times when the courts must play a
countermajoritarian role.
Probably neither the idealist nor the cynic would be shocked to
see that partisan labeling matters for a judge’s perceived credibility
in ruling on a politically controversial issue. And yet the idealist
might worry that judges thought to be of the same party as a
current administration would have to carry more of the burden of
83. Greenwood, supra note 5.
84. This cynic might well point to the large gap in beliefs between those who oppose
DACA and those who do not (even within a sample of only Republicans) in the {No ruling}
condition, and remark that whatever influence the courts might have apparently does little
to close that gap. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; supra Tables 1 & 2.
85. See FALLON, supra note 6. And as Professor Grove has reminded us, acquiescence is
hardly a given in historical perspective, even for rulings of the Supreme Court. See Grove,
supra note 7.
86. Such dynamics of “specific support” and “diffuse support,” respectively, tend to be
discussed in relation to the sociological legitimacy of the Supreme Court. See generally Nelson
& Gibson, supra note 6. Yet they may also be applicable to the lower federal courts, especially
as these courts are increasingly pushed into the spotlight. In addition, there is the possibility
that trends in lower-court rulings can be used by the Supreme Court to boost the acceptability
of its own rulings. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System,
70 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2017).
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credibility, in the public eye, in ruling against the government in
such high-profile cases. Or is that a ray of hope?87
The idealist, being an optimist, might also point out that the
subjects in this study were expressly told that the Supreme Court
had not yet taken up the issue. Could it be that some subjects
therefore inferred that the legal question remained unsettled? Fair
enough—and yet, this may be cold comfort in our particular political
moment. Among the dozens of legal challenges to the Trump Admin-
istration’s actions, only a handful will make it to the Supreme
Court. It seems likely that the posture of the DACA cases at the
time of this survey will also be the enduring posture in case after
case, with the lower federal courts blocking a government action.88
If so, it will be their judicial credibility that matters.
87. There have been other such rulings of late. Judge Dana M. Sabraw, a George W. Bush
appointee, ruled that a plaintiff challenging the Administration’s practice of separating
families at the southern border was likely to succeed on the merits. See Ms. L. v. U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (ICE), 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142-46 (S.D. Cal. 2018). Trump-
appointed judges have also ruled against the Administration. Judge Timothy J. Kelly ruled
that the White House violated due process when it revoked CNN reporter Jim Acosta’s press
pass. See Transcript of Motion Hearing at 14-15, Cable News Network, Inc. v. Trump, No.
1:18-cv-02610-TJK (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2018), ECF No. 22. Judge Dabney L. Friedrich ruled that
the appointment of Special Counsel Robert Mueller satisfied the requirements of the
Constitution’s Appointments Clause and did not violate core separation of powers principles.
See United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 602, 623-24
(D.D.C. 2018).
88. See Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is
Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://beta.washington
post.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-
court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html [https://perma.cc/59WS-
6X3Q]; INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts,
https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup [https://perma.cc/R7BT-BLLD]. This is not
to overlook the possibility of inferences being drawn (by some among the public) from denials
of certiorari by the Supreme Court that the Court agrees with the lower courts’ rulings. In the
DACA cases, the Court did grant certiorari—but at the time of these surveys, it had not yet
done so. And as this Article goes to press, the Court has yet to rule on the merits.
